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Kraus's Boethian lnterpretation
of Whitehead's God
Rem B. Edwards
In reading Elizabeth M. Kraus's The Metaphgsics of Experience,
A Companion to Whitehead's Process and Reality,I was particularly
disappointed by her concluding chapter on "God and the World," for
there it becomes apparent that she has been reading Whitehead's
remarks on theological topics through the jaundiced eyes of Boethius,
St. Thomas Aquinas, and classical theology. After rejecting Harts-
horne's temporalistic modification of Whitehead's theology, for rea-
sons we shall soon examine, Kraus states her own position on God's
relation to temporality as follows:
It seems closer to Whitehead's intentions, therefore, to infer
that the divine actual world includes all actual worlds simultane-
ously and all spatio-temporal drops emerging from those actual
worlds in unison of becoming. From the divine perspective, time
becomes space in the sense that all "times" are co-present in
divine feelings, although retaining, and related by, the various
forms of extensive connection. (p. tM)
By what strange logic does Kraus manage to make Whitehead
come out sounding like Boethius? Her position is that even in his
consequent nature, God coexists simultaneously and changelessly
with the entire past, present, and future of every occasion in every
cosmic epoch. Her rationale for such a view seems to rest upon (1) u
highly questionable interpretation of one text in Process and Realttg
and the claims (2) that only such a view is compatible with human
freedom and (3) that only such a view is compatible with human faith.
I think that she is mistaken on all three counts.
(1)On page 163, in discussing the scope of the divine actual world,
Kraus tells us that "some Whiteheadian scholars, notably Charles
Hartshorne, have rejected Whitehead's assertion that God is "always
in concrescence and never in the past" (PR 47) and replaced it with
an interpretation of God as a personal order of divine occasions." On
page 169 she paraphrases this text to mean "the divine concrescence
is never in the past of any occasion," which in turn is construed to
mean that all times are copresent in the divine consequent nature.
This excludes all real process or succession in the divine experience.
The greatest difficulty with this construction is that it is clearly incom-
patib-le with the many passages in which Whitehead clearly 
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such process and "novel advance" in the consequent nature. For
example, God's consequent nature "evolves in its relationship to the
evolving world without derogation to the eternal completion of its
primordial conceptual nature" (PR 19) and "is always immediate,
always many, always one, always with nooel adoance, mooing onuard
and never perishing" (PR S2,Llitalics mine). Whitehead insisted that
"this final phase of passage in God's nature is eoer enlargingitself" (PR
53G--italics mine), that it is "an unresting adoance beyond itselfl' (PR
53l-italics mine), that "the actuality of God must also be understood
as a multiplicity of actual components in process o/ creation (PR
53l-italics mine) and that "in every respect God and the World move
conversely to each other in respect to their process" (PR 529-italics
mine).
Such affirmations of endless development in the divine conse-
quent nature cannot be reconciled with Kraus's interpretation of God
as eternally complete in every respect, and another interpretation of
God's being "aldays in concrer""ri"" and never in the p"it" is called
for. Instead of meaning that all times are copresent with God, if
Whitehead's consistency is to be preserved, this must mean simply
that God absorbs past events of the world and all elements of his own
antecedent activity and experience into his consequent nature without
losing anything of them. Even after the events of the world perish for
themselves, they do not perish for God. To be "past" in physical time
is to have perished, but neither the world as objectively immortalized
in God nor anything else in the divine nature and experience is ever
"in the past" in this sense. "Why should there not be novelty without
loss of this direct unison of immediacy among things? In the temporal
world, it is the empirical fact that process entails loss: the past is
present under an abstraction. But there is no reason, of any ultimate
metaphysical generality, why this should be the whole story" (PR 517).
God's relation to the world is one in which "succession does not mean
loss of immediate unison" (PR 531). This clearly afiirms succession in
God but denies loss and perishing. God is "never in the past" in the
sense in which being in the past involves loss and perishing, but there
is real process in God, nevertheless, which enables Whitehead to
affirm with perfect consistency that "neither God, nor the World,
reaches static completion" (PR 529).
That there is real succession in God is compatible with there being
no loss, but unending novel advance in God is precisely what classical
theology has denied in conceiving of God's eternity as the simultaneitv
of the past, present, and future of a[ epochal universes all at once in
God. The classical position has always had the net effect of making
time a human illusion, something which adequate knowledge would
transcend and overcome. Kraus herself makes iust such a move, as she
writes:
Thus, from the divine vantage point, the endless fruitions of the
creativity are simultaneously co-present in the immediacies of
their self-creative activities. The divine concrescence quoad se is
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complete insofar as past and future are not relevant terms. In
eternity, interminabilis aitae tota simul et perfecta possessio (Bo-
ethius, De consolatione Philosophiae , V. 6)r God's physical feeling
IS complete, Quoad, nos, however, it is incomplete, in that the
future from any perspective is not yet actual and is perpetually
actualizing itself. (p. L7L)
The view that the future is incomplete and indeterminate only from
our finite perspective whereas it is complete and determinate from the
divine perspective is just the view which process theology rejects
rather than afiirms, though there may be more than one way of devel-
oping an alternative metaphysic available to process thinkers. Process
thinkers should not at any rate be trapped into denying the reality of
time from ony actttal point of view, for as that great process thinker
Benjamin Franklin once pointed out, time is "the stufflife is made of. "
(2) Amazingly enough, Kraus maintains that only the"tota simul"
in God is compatible with human freedom. Needless to say, the
mainstream of process thought has insisted instead that it is the "block
universe" of classical theology which is irreconcilable with human
freedom. Kraus supports her view by producing an argument against
what she apparently takes to be the only alternative position open to
Whiteherdirrr, the "interpretation of'God as , p6rrorral order of
divine occasions" of Charles Hartshorne (p. 163). Her argument
against this position, as best I can discern and sum marize it, is that
each new divine occasion would in turn be irresistiblg objectified or
"superjected" (she uses this as a verb) back into the world, which
would "bind the present irrevocably to the past, to sacrifice spontanei-
ty and autonomy at the altar of necessity" (p. 164). This deterministic
outcome of Hartshorne's theology is supposedlv entailed by "the prin-
ciple of relativity" (p. 163). I must confess that I have never seenluch
an abuse of the principle of relativity! This principle, according to
which "it belongs to the nature of a'being' that it is a potential for every
'becoming' " (PR 33), is never allowed bv Whitehead to have deter-
ministic implications precisely because there are all sorts of degrees
of relevance of one actual occasion to another. Whitehead pointed out
in discussing the principle of relativity that "according to this principle
an actual entity is present in other actual entities. In fact if we allow
for degrees of relevance, and for negligible relevance, we must say
that every actual entity is present in every other actual entity" (PR 79).
Kraus's 
"ig.r-"nt simply ihils to allow foi degrees of ,elevanceand fornegligible relevance.
(3) Kraus also insists that only a"tota simul" in God is compatible
with faith, arguing much as she did above that the Hartshornean
alternative is by the principle of relativity irreconcilable with faith as
well as freedom-with f.ee faith, that is. (C"lrirrirts would tremble at
the very thought of such.) Her discussion here is complicated by its
relation to a v[w of how God redeems the world: "To 6e actual, bod
must take on a 'body' and in so doing, redeem: i.e. he must have
physical feelings of the totality of each and all ftnite achievements,
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integrating them into the ongoing unity of his consequent nature" (p.
163). Kraus's complaint about Hartshornean theology is that on this
view "God would be compelled to perform successive redemptive
acts" (p. 163) which would in turn be objectified back into the world.
In other words, an enduring creature would be confronted willy-
nilly with the fact of its past redemption and compelled to accept
it, to integrate it as part of its present determinateness in the same
way as it must appropriate any other fact in its actual world. . . .
To make redemption an historical series of acts rather than one
overarching process takes it out of the realm of "faith" and into
the realm of objective, inescapable fact. (p. 16a)
Aside from the fact that the principle of relativity entails no such
conclusions, it should also be observed that Kraus's position here
entails a strange conflation of divine and human subjectivities. If our
lives are objectively immortal in God, as they are on Whitehead's
view, we really don't have the slightest bit of choice about the matter.
There we are, embalmed forever, whether we like it or not. Even if
we did make a choice about it, that choice would itself be objectively
immortal in the divine subjectivity is not a choice open to human
subjectivity. Belieoing that, havingfaith that, or accepting that we are
so immortal is within our province, however. There is no causal or
logical connection, thanks to degrees of relativity, between being
objectively immortal and believing or accepting that we are so. If there
were, we would all accept and believe it, whereas the only people in
the world that I have ever met who actuallv do believe it are a handful
of process theologians!
I conclude therefore that Kraus is quite unjustified when she
writes that
This "withness" of God's concrescence, its simultaneity with that
of all finite occasions, is the creature s guarantee of finite freedom
and at the same time the keystone of creaturely faith and hope.
All creatures, all spaces, and all times, past, present, and future,
are everlastingly knit together in beauty in the divine conscious-
ness. (p. 168)
Her position is totally irreconcilable with the many texts in which
Whitehead suggests that there is real succession and process in God
himself. This is most obvious in her own discussion of the text "God
is fluent" (PR 528), which she interprets to mean that "the divine
consequent nature acquires fluency as it ever expands in its ongoing
absorption of finite achievement" (p. 170). No meaning can possiblv
be given to "ever expands" and "ongoing" if the consequent nature is
understood to be a "tota simul." She recognizes the "paradox" in-
volved in the thought that something is "always complete yet always
growing" (p. 170), which she claims "results from the incapacity of the
human mind to conceive non-temporal sequence" (p. 170). This is like
saying that although there are round squares, the "paradox" involved
in the thought that "something is a round square" results from the
33
Eowanns / Kneus's IxtrnpnBtATIoN or WntrsHneo's Goo 
:
incapacity of the human mind to conceive round squareness! Wel just
can'[ let her get away with that. One of the greatest virtues of prbce.s,s
theology haJbeen its i.rterrse effort to eliminate such blatant',self-
contrailiction in theology, and it is much less than helpful to start
playing the same old fun and games all over again.
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